政府治理、终极产权与公司投资同步性

Government Governance,Ultimate Ownership and Co-movement in Investment

本文基于中国转型经济制度背景,以2005年-2007年间中国上市公司为对象,考察了地方政府治理水平对企业投资行为的作用机理。研究发现较高的地方政府治理水平能够激励和监督管理者做出基于公司专有信息的投资决策,而不是盲目地模仿行业内其他公司的投资行为,降低行业和公司层面的投资同步性。如果地方政府治理水平较高,公司利益被政府或其他官僚机构侵占概率会降低,这会提高公司从信息采集中获取的期望收益,降低公司投资同步性;进一步研究发现,地方政府治理水平对公司投资同步性的影响在终极产权不同性质的公司中存在着显著性差异,相对国有企业,地方政府对投资行为的治理效应在民营企业中更显著,政府治理对国有企业投资行为的影响随着实际控制人的行政级别提高而降低。

In this paper, we examine the government agents and the risk of insider agents embedded in government and corporate agents of quality effect and corporate governance conflicts investment performance based on the twin agency theory framework. We find that government quality and corporate governance mechanisms can reduce the investment co-movement at the industry and firm level. The higher level the local government governance is at, the less likely the government or other bureaucratic agencies are to expropriate the interests of investors. This will reduce the company＇s incentive to obtain information from the private costs and lead to higher investment co-movement. These results suggest that studying or assessing the financial behavior of listed companies in China and its economic consequences needs to focus not only on the risks within the company＇s agency problems, but also on the risk of a government agent to the company behavior. The company＇s investment behavior should be based on the local government investment environment, rather than simply the company＇s investment decision-making.