基于逆向选择和动态博弈的项目管理人员执行能力分析

Executive Ability Analysis of Project Management Members Based on Adverse Selection And Dynamic Game

构建了通过人才市场选聘执行能力强的项目管理人员的逆向选择模型。研究揭示了房地产开发企业通过制定不低于市场均衡价格但低于项目管理人员给出的估计价格,再经过第二轮的提高薪酬,使得原来主动放弃的乙方重新被选聘。该规则能够较好地选择到执行能力较强的项目管理人员。另外,基于动态博弈理论构建了项目管理人员执行能力显示模型。分析表明,项目管理人员的执行能力越高,项目管理人员选择受惩罚水平也越高。项目经理可以通过观测项目管理人员选择的惩罚水平高低来判断其执行能力,进而判断出该项目管理人员的自身价值。

Based on adverse selection model, the study shows that through giving the price not lower than the market equilibrium price but less than the price of his evaluation, project manager can select his members with better executive ability. Based on the Ross model, it is analyzed to apply the dynamic game theory of incomplete information from perspective of punishment choice about the executive ability of project man- agement members. The higher executive ability of project management member is, the higher level of punishment of his selection is. Project manager can observe the level of the punishment to judge the executive ability of the members and their value.