摘要
弗雷格在自己的语言哲学体系里提出了著名的"涵义"理论,并将这样的"涵义"解释为指称对象的"给定方式";"给定方式"存在于语言或数学表达之中,只有通过这样的"给定方式",联系同一对象的不同信息和认知模式才得以呈现;然而,囿于"经验实在论"的限制,弗雷格将自己的"涵义"及其"给定方式"放置在了一个非理性的语言符号世界之中,从而导致了弗雷格"涵义"因"实在论"需要而失去其真实"位置"的结果。文章基于相关理论的分析,旨在确立弗雷格"涵义"及其"给定方式"的位置与主体,探讨"涵义"及其"给定方式"的理性回归之路。
Frege has put forward his famous "Sense" in the philosophy of language, and made it known as the "given form" ; the "given form" has been exhibited in the language as well as mathematics to convey variable information or recog- nizable models with the same reference. Because Frege has been restricted by his own "Empiricism and Realism", he has put the "Sense" and its "given form" into the irrational linguistic world, and made the "Sense" lose its real position. Based on the relevant theories, the purpose of the paper is to reestablish the position as well as the subject of "Sense" and its "given form", and at last to establish the way back to rational world.
出处
《外国语文》
北大核心
2012年第6期75-79,共5页
Foreign Languages and Literature
关键词
涵义
指称
给定方式
sense
reference
given form