创新获利条件、合作控制权与载体商业模式——基于C-P-C逻辑的合作创新控制权分析框架

Profit Conditions of Innovation,Cooperation Control and Carrier's Business Model——Analytical Frame for Control of Cooperative Innovation Based on C-P-C Logic

和单纯的科学发明、技术创新不同,由高校、企业及科研机构等共同组建的合作创新载体,其产出成果的创新性必须以是否具有市场价值,即其提供的解决方案是否能够盈利来衡量。当合作创新载体的起点技术、产出应用环境不同时,其创新获利条件也不同。本文提出,作为一种非完全共同利益联盟,控制权在管理和研发这两类不同角色间的分配,将影响载体产出对创新获利条件的满足水平,以及载体本身的发展轨迹。针对理论与政策设计上的认识空白,根据合作博弈理论中Shapley分配模型,提出了面向创新获利条件的合作控制权配置C-P-C逻辑和相应的多层次效应分析框架,以支持控制权合理配置。对比发现,目前有关合作创新载体的组建实施办法中,在合作控制权配置问题上存在模糊与缺位情况,归纳了由此可能产生的两类"制度陷阱"。最后,就政府有关合作创新的政策思路和管理措施改进提出了若干建议。

Unlike simple scientific inventions or technology innovations, the innovation carriers, cooperated between high schools, enterprises and scientific institutions, have their outputs innovativeness measured by the market value, which is whether the solutions they supplied can earn profits or not. The innovation profit conditions of the carriers vary from the difference of their starting technologies and output applications. This paper proposes that as an incomplete common interests alliance, operation control allocation between the roles of management and research ＆ development will have an influence on the extent of how innovation profit conditions is satisfied by the outputs of the carrier, as well as the development of the carrier. For the acknowledge gap of theory and policy design, this paper puts forward C-P-C of cooperative domination allocation towards innovation profit condition as well as the corresponding multi-level effect analysis outline to provide supports for reasonable domination allocation. By comparison, this paper finds there is vagueness and absence problem on cooperation domination allocation in current implement measures for cooperative innovation cartier establishment, and concludes two possible resulted ＂institutional traps＂. In the end, the paper suggests some policy ideas and important management measures for cooperative innovation.