政府定价机制下黑龙江省农户灌溉行为的负外部性分析

Analysis on Negative Externality of Farmer Irrigation Behavior Under the Government Pricing Mechanism in Heilongjiang Province

结合黑龙江省农业水价的政策现状和调研走访情况,认识农户灌溉行为产生的初因,指出农户灌溉行为的负外部性表现,并对负外部性的实质进行经济学分析。研究表明:在政府定价机制下,农业用水价格的实施不利于鼓励农户在生产中主动节约用水,农业水资源的浪费会增加社会用水的边际成本。适宜采取产权界定的方式将外部性内部化,通过农业水资源的合理经营和再配置,将农业水资源的价格形成机制逐步市场化,通过价格杠杆作用实现水资源的高效利用和帕累托最优。

This paper combined with the pricing policy of the Heilongjiang agricultural water and field research.The article clued from understanding the reasons for farmer irrigation behavior,and then described the negative external performance of the irrigation behavior,focusing on the substance of the negative externalities of economics.Research showed that,in the government pricing mechanism,the implementation of the existing agricultural water price was not conducive to encouraging farmers to take the initiative to save water in production.As a result,water wastage in agriculture has increased the social marginal cost of water.In the author ' s view,the definition of property rights was the best way for the internalization of external effects,which can achieve efficient use of water resources,and Pareto optimality by reconfiguring and operating the water resources.