会计稳健性或高管股权激励——不同代理冲突下的治理方式选择

The Governance Options under Different Agency Conflicts: Accounting Conservatism or Executive Equity Incentive

会计稳健性和高管股权激励是上市公司降低代理成本的重要途径,其治理效应备受关注。本文选择2008～2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司作为研究样本,按照代理冲突程度高低将研究样本划分为两类,在此基础上实证研究会计稳健性与高管股权激励的治理效应。研究结果表明:在低代理冲突样本组中,会计稳健性能显著降低代理成本,而高管股权激励的治理效果不显著;在高代理冲突样本组中,高管股权激励能显著降低代理成本,而会计稳健性的治理效果不显著。研究显示出,在选择合适的治理方式时,必须考虑代理冲突的严重程度。

Abstract： Accounting conservatism and executive equity incentive are important ways of listed companies to reduce the agency costs, and their governance effect received considerable attention. We take China A shares of non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2010 as study samples and divide them into two categories according to the agency conflict degree. Based on this, we make an empirical test of the governance effect of accounting conservatism and executive incentive. The results show as follows： in the sample group of low agency conflict, accounting conservatism can reduce the agency costs significantly, but the performance of executive equity incentive is not notable; in the sample group of high agency conflict, executive equity incentive can reduce the agency costs significantly, but the performance of accounting conservatism is not notable. The significance of this paper is when we choose the right way of the governance, we must consider the agency conflict degree.