佃农理论范式下企业技术联盟博弈模型

Corporation's Technology Coalition Game Model Under the Tenancy Theory Paradigm

本文从佃农理论的合作博弈逻辑范式出发,证明分成契约也是有效率的。接着,根据风险承担的程度,本文把联盟成员分为内核型集团和外缘型集团两类,即把技术联盟看作地主和佃农之间的租金分成契约网络,然后构建一个包含交易费用的多人谈判的联盟博弈模型分析各个联盟成员所占的租金分成比例的Shapley值。最后,本文认为,分成契约帮助技术联盟节约的风险成本和监督成本,能够弥补谈判成本的增量部分,企业技术联盟采用类似佃农理论中的分成契约是总交易费用最小化的理性选择。

Under the Tenancy Theory Paradigm, this paper proves that the sharing contract is also effi- cient with the cooperation game logic. And, basing on the degree of risk, it transfers the internal and external group of the technology coalition into a rent - sharing contract between landlord and tenant. What＇s more, it builds a multiply bargaining coalition game theory model with transaction costs. This model gives the solution of all kinds of players＇ Shapley Value on rent sharing ratios. Especially, the sharing contract can reduces the risk costs and monitoring costs which will cover the incremental bargaining costs. As a result, the technology coalition adopts the sharecropping contract in the Tenancy Theory, which is a rational choice to minimize total transaction costs.