一股一票原则与不同投票权股的发行

The Principle of "One Share One Vote" and Issue of Dual-class Share

中国大部分学者将"一股一权"作为股东大会表决的原则,并认为这一原则在法理上得到了坚固的支持。但大部分国家立法并没有将这一原则贯彻在立法中。在公司法中严格贯彻"一股一权"原则会造成公司股权结构僵化,缺乏弹性的股权结构并不利于公司发展。无投票权股或超级投票权股的发行对公司治理产生积极的抑或消极的影响,在理论和实证研究上并没有一致结论,但可以确定的是,保护投资者的法律制度会在某种程度上消解这些消极影响,资本市场也会在一定程度上迫使交易各方作出高效率的交易安排。中国应在健全保护小股东的基础上,适当放松对公司股权结构的立法干预。

In China, most scholars consider ＂one share one vote＂ as a principle of voting at shareholder meeting, they insist that this principle has strong theoretical basis; but it is not true in most corporation laws of other countries. Carrying through ＂one share one vote＂ strictly in corporation law will make a corporation share structure rigid, the result will go against the corporation development. Although issuing non-voting share or super-voting share may have some negative influence to corporate governance, the institutions of protecting investor in corpora- tion law will mitigate the problems and market can also make the exchanging parties accept effective arrangement. We should de-regulate the share structure of corporation in China＇ s corporation law, if we can improve the protecting investor institutions.