摘要
现行相关立法缺乏一人公司为股东担保行为规制规则,使得一人公司股东及其债权人极容易侵损一人公司产权及公司债权人的可预期收益,从而忽视了正义和效率价值。重构一人公司为股东担保行为的规制规则并非是要回到2005年修订《公司法》前的完全禁止模式,而是应当对相应担保行为加以严格限制。这就需要明确法人型股东的担保决定权,建立和完善一人公司债权人的直接保护机制和一人公司担保行为强制性信息披露制度。
The lack of the regulation rules on the behavior of one company providing guarantee for shareholder leads to the cut losses of one company’s property and it’s creditors.Thus,one company’s shareholder could realize the negative externalities behaviors to share and transfer the risks of realizing creditor’s rights.the values of justice and efficiency could also be injured.The construction of the regulation rules on the behavior of one company providing guarantee for shareholder is not to go back to the completely banning modes before the company law revised in 2005,but to erect strict regulations,such as awarded the decision to the legal person type shareholder,establishing and improving one person’s company creditor’s direct protection mechanisms and the mandatory information disclosure systems.Such an arranged system would bring more profit to the most subjects related to this guarantee.
出处
《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》
CAS
2013年第1期65-71,共7页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
基金
国家社科基金项目"经济发展方式转变的产业政策协同法律机制研究"(11XFX021)
教育部社科基金项目"外部性问题解决的经济法进路研究"(09XJC820013)的系列成果之一
关键词
规则缺失
隐性利益
负外部性
制度绩效
法经济学
the lack of the regulation rules
recessive interests
negative externality
institutional performance
Law and Economics