意向、理由与行动——兼论实用主义的相关主张

Intention,Reason,Action and Related Claims of Pragmatism

行动总是有意向的,意向构成了行动的理由。但并不是所有的意向都能成为行动的理由,意向是否可以成为理由,不是由行动者说了算的,它涉及到社会视角。从社会视角看,行动可以是有理由而无意向的。个人提供意向,社会保证理由,理想的行动应出自意向与理由的统一。只有作为推论结果的意向才是合理的,推论不是个人的事情,是社会实践中形成的、为大家所遵守的实质推论,它不需要还原为形式推论。新实用主义与古典实用主义的区别在于,前者更加关注理性(语言)对行动的意义,后者更加重视行动对理性(语言)的作用。新实用主义补充了古典实用主义,但同时也偏离了古典实用主义的一些基本主张。

An action is a performance with an intention while an intention may constitute a reason for the action. However,it is not true that each intention will constitute a reason of an action. Whether an intention is qualified to be a reason is not solely determined by an individual agent. In contrast,this involves a social perspective. From the social perspective,we can legitimately claim a reason rather than an intention of an action. An individual agent is responsible for the intention whereas the society ensures the reason. In an ideal action,its intention is compatible with its reason. An intention is not rational unless it is a consequence of a material inference,which is by no means private but formed in social practice and followed by the public. A material inference does not need to be reduced to a formal inference. The main difference between new and classical pragmatism is that the former cares more about how reason ( language) affects an action,whereas the latter pays more attention to how an action affects reason ( language) . New pragmatism not only supplements but also diverges from classical pragmatism to some extent.