从莫利纽克斯难题看知觉体验的具身性

On the Embodiment of Perceptual Experience: From the Perspective of Molyneux’s Problem

三百多年前提出的莫利纽克斯难题曾经是心智哲学和心理学的主要问题之一。对这个问题的否定回答蕴含着经验主义的知觉原则。近年来,发展心理学对新生婴儿模仿能力的研究成果引发了我们对莫利纽克斯难题和传统知觉原则的再思考。这个再思考的过程是一个运用新的具身知觉理论的过程,同时也是一个印证和检验其合理性的过程。

Molyneux’s problem was brought up more than 300 years ago,and it has been one of the main issues in the field of philosophy of mind and psychology. The answer of'no'to this question entails a perceptual principle of empiricism. In recent years,the research on the imitation of newborns triggered the rethinking of Molyneux’s problem and the traditional perceptual principle. This is a process of applying the embodied perceptual theory,and also a process of testifying its validity.