管理者盈利预测、过度自信与市场效应

Management Earnings Forecasts, Managerial Overconfidence And Market effects

管理者盈利预测在金融市场中具有重要的经济地位,我们选择了沪深两市2006-2009年的管理者盈利预测数据对管理者盈利预测与管理者过度自信、市场效应之间的关系进行了检验,与Hilary和Hsu的研究结论不同,我们发现:(1)管理者当前的盈利预测准确性会受到历史盈利预测准确性的影响,管理者在经历了较多的准确盈利预测之后会变得过度自信;(2)管理者在盈利预测上的过度自信会导致当前盈利预测的准确性降低;(3)管理者历史盈利预测的准确性并不会对市场造成明显影响,投资者和分析师在当前管理者盈利预测信息发布之后所做出的反应与管理者盈利预测历史准确的次数无显著的相关关系。本文的研究不仅丰富了国内有关盈利预测研究的相关文献,而且对提高我国资本市场上管理者盈利预测的准确性,加强市场参与者对上市公司信息披露的使用效率,进而提升投资决策具有重要的启示作用,同时对于我国监管机构完善信息披露制度具有重要政策意义。

Management earnings forecasts have important impact in the financial markets. We chose 2006-2009 profit forecast data of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange to test the relations among managers earnings forecasts ,managerial overconfidence and market effect. Different from Hilary and Hsu＇s results, we found： （1）the current accuracy of managers＇ earnings forecasts are affected by their historical accuracy, managers will become overconfidence after a series of accurate forecasts; （2）managers＇ overconfidence will lead their current accuracy of managers＇ earnings forecasts to be lower; （3）managers＇ historical forecasts accuracy has no market effect, which is proved by that the reaction of investors and analysts has no significant relation to the managers＇ historical accuracy. Our study not only enriches literature relevant to the study of earnings estimates, but also has important policy implications for the regulatory agencies on the on the development of information disclosure system.