增长机会、业绩风险与上市公司管理层薪酬业绩敏感度

Growth Opportunity, Performance Risk and Pay Performance Sensitivity

本文以2005-2007年上市公司数据为基础,分析了业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间的关系。结果发现,经典委托代理理论关于业绩风险与薪酬激励强度负相关的结论没有得到稳定的支持。公司增长机会显著影响上述关系,表现为对于增长机会很小或没有增长机会的公司而言,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度负相关;而对于增长机会大的公司而言,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度正相关。表明基于节约激励成本的角度,蕴含较大增长机会的上市公司更适合股权与期权的激励方式。

How to match the performance risk and incentive is essential to the design of managerial compensation.We examine a sample of managerial compensation provided from the Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2007. Based on the sample, we address the relationship between performance risk and pay performance sensitivity. Our evidence indicates that the negative relationship between performance risk and pay performance sensitivity predicted by Principal-agent Theory does not gets stable support. Moreover, we also find the growth opportunity affects the relationship significantly. pay performance sensitivity decreases as the performance risk increases in the companies with small growth opportunity, while the pay performance sensitivity turns to be positive to the performance risk in the companies with bigger growth opportunity. From the perspective of saving incentive costs, the companies with bigger growth opportunity are more suitable for equity incentive.