市场竞争、产权与政府补贴

Market Competition,Ownership and Government Subsidy

针对近期引起广泛关注的政府补贴问题,本文基于补贴的盈余管理动机,深入考察了市场竞争和公司所有权对政府补贴的影响以及政府补贴的后果。在控制行业与政治关联的基础上,本文发现:第一,国有企业整体上比民营企业获得更高的政府补贴;第二,亏损企业获得了更高的补贴,但企业产权性质对政府补贴存在边际影响;第三,随着市场竞争的加剧,无论是行业层面还是地区层面,国有企业都获得了更高的补贴。最后,基于国家统计局提供的中国工业企业数据库的数据进一步说明了研究结果的稳健性。本文研究为监管部门提供了及时、明晰的政策建议,这有助于监管部门出台有针对性的举措,以应对当前海内外针对政府补贴国有企业的质疑。

Government subsidy has attracted extensive attention recently. We study effects of competition and ownership on subsidy with distinguishing subsidy motivations. Controlling the industry and political connection, we show that： 1 ） state- owned enterprises （SOEs） get more subsidies than Non-SOEs, 2） the firms in loss tend to obtain more subsidies, while the ownership has marginal effects on this relation, 3 ） the increasing market competition, from both of the industry ＆ area, leads to SOEs obtaining more subsidies, and 4） results based on the large sample from Chinese industrial enterprises database and alternative measures further support our findings. We offer timely and clearly political implications to the regulators.