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基于延伸售后保证下供应链的售后服务设计 被引量:4

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摘要 文章基于博弈论和消费者效用理论,构建了在两种不同结构供应链下的延伸售后保证设计模型,分别讨论了供应链的分散决策机制下各个参与者在产品市场和售后保证市场中的占优决策以及最大利润的问题,并构建相应的博弈模型。
出处 《统计与决策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第5期45-50,共6页 Statistics & Decision
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(7097111) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC630264) 福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2012J01304)
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