摘要
研究了一个制造商领导市场、一个零售商和一个第三方回收商共同负责回收且跟随决策的再制造闭环供应链系统。对制造商领导博弈时的四种不同市场结构下(M→R+T、M→R→T、M→T→R和M→C)的闭环供应链的各方决策变量值以及利润值进行计算及分析,最后采用重复博弈方法对避免劣市场结构(M→C)成立的条件进行了讨论。研究表明,基于以上条件,M→C市场结构下的回收价最低,在M→R+T市场结构下最高;M→C市场结构下,制造商的利润与供应链利润最低;M→R+T市场结构下的制造商利润最高且供应链利润也最高。M→R→T和M→T→R市场结构的供应链总利润结果完全相同。集团C中的利润分配参数α具有不稳定性,使效率最低的M→C市场结构无法长期存在。
This paper researched remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain system that composed of a manufacturer which leads game, a retailer and a third-party collector followed the decision which was responsible for recycling. When a manufac- turer was the leader of the game, it calculated the decision variables and profits of the closed-loop supply chain under four dif- ferent market structures( M→R + T、M→R→T、M→T→R and M→C) ,then analyzed the calculated results in-depth. Finally formed the condition to avoid poor market structure ( M → C) based on repeated games. Studies show that : the recovery is lowest in the M→C market structure while the highest in the M→R + T market structure; the profits of manufacturers and sup- ply chain is the least in the M→C market structure while the highest in the M→R + T market structure ; the total supply chain profits is exactly the same in the M→R→T and M→T→R market structure. In the case of mixed recycling channels, the profit distribution parameter a in group C is unstable; something could make the least efficient market structure M→C not to exist for α Ion,, time.
出处
《计算机应用研究》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第3期720-723,727,共5页
Application Research of Computers
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL010)
国家教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJA630064)
国家教育部高等学校博士点基金资助项目(20113218110024)
江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CXLX12-0180)
关键词
闭环供应链
混合回收渠道
不同市场结构
重复博弈
closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)
hybrid recycling channels
different market structures
repeated game