外部治理环境、行业管制与过度投资

External Governance Environment,Industry Regulation and Over-investment

基于法与金融理论和管制俘虏理论,外部治理环境和行业管制对企业的过度投资行为有一定的影响。在定性分析不同行业管制情况下外部治理环境与企业过度投资关系的基础上,选用2001年至2010年沪深两市的非金融类上市公司数据为研究样本,描述上市公司过度投资区域分布特征,构建外部治理环境与过度投资关系的OLS回归模型,分别以管制行业和非管制行业样本对OLS回归模型进行分组实证检验。研究结果表明,管制行业上市公司的过度投资分布呈现局域空间集群现象,非管制行业上市公司的过度投资分布尚无规律可循。在管制行业中,外部治理环境(政府干预程度、法治水平、金融发展水平)对上市公司过度投资程度有显著的负向影响;在非管制行业,外部治理环境(政府干预程度、法治水平、金融发展水平)与过度投资呈显著正相关。进一步研究表明,在外部治理环境因素中,各地区的法治水平对上市公司过度投资行为的影响效应最大。

Based on law and finance theory and regulatory capture theory, our research results provide evidences that external governance environment and industry regulation may have a certain impact on corporate over-investment. On the basis of qualita- tive analysis of the relationship between external governance environment and corporate over-investment under different conditions of industry regulation, this paper, with the data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2010, describes the regional distribution characteristics of over-investment of Chinese listed companies and builds an OLS regression model of the external governance environment and over-investment, which is empirically tested in groups by samples in regulated and non-regulated industries. The results show that, the over-investment distribution of listed companies in regulated industries presents a local spatial cluster phenomenon whereas the distribution characteristics of those in non-regulated industries show no regularity. External governance environment factors （ level of government intervention, rule of law and financial develop- ment） exert a significant negative influence on the over-investment degree of listed companies in regulated industries and have a notable positive correlation with over-investment in non-regulated industries. Our further study indicates that, compared with gov- ernment intervention and financial development, the rule of law has more influence on the over-investment of listed companies.