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公平偏好下的渠道成员价格决策及其动态检验 被引量:11

Research on Channel Members' Price Decision and Its Dynamic Tests Based on Fairness Preference
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摘要 公平偏好行为成为渠道成员决策的重要考虑因素,利用实验的方法研究公平偏好下渠道成员的价格决策。通过博弈实验方法研究渠道成员的价格决策并做进一步的动态检验,分别设定控制条件、公平关系和权势关系3个条件研究不同环境下的价格决策,并对价格决策的动态性进行检验,最后通过Logit模型估计偏好参数。研究结果表明,实验中决策者制定的价格低于传统理论分析的结果,接近于公平偏好理论下的结果,证明存在公平偏好;权势关系下渠道的整体收益最低,公平关系下的收益最高,说明公平偏好确实在渠道交易中起正面效用;激烈的竞争导致公平偏好下降,实验者经济目标和公平偏好随时间变动有互动关系。研究结果可对渠道价格契约的设计提出指导性建议,相关的数值计算为进一步研究提供理论支持。 We draw on experimental methods to study channel members' price decision since fairness preference is becoming a major consideration for such behavior. The gme testing method is used to dynamically test channel members' price decision in three setting conditions : control, fair and power. Then we estimate preference parameters by the Logit model. The results of our analysis prove the existence of fairness preference since the price of maker's decision is lower than that of traditional theoretical results and closes to that of fairness preference theoretical results. The overall revenue is lowest in power condition and highest in fair condition, which demonstrates that fairness preference plays a positive role in channel transactions. Fierce competition will lead to the decline of fairness preference and over time there exists interactive relationship between subjects' economic objective and fairness preference. Our research results propose instructive suggestion to the design of channel price contract, while related numerical calculation provides theoretical support for further research.
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第1期48-57,共10页 Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(71202005 71002031) 上海教委创新基金重点项目(12ZS073)~~
关键词 公平偏好 渠道 价格决策 实验 fairness preference channel price decision experiment
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