互补性研发努力下垂直合作新产品开发中的收益共享契约设计

Revenue-sharing Contract Design for Vertical Collaborative New Product Development with Complementary Efforts

研发努力表现为互补还是替代关系,对于合作新产品开发中激励契约的设计有重要影响。在研发努力存在互补关系的情形下,探讨垂直合作新产品开发中的收益共享机制。研究表明,新产品开发的组织安排取决于由研发努力弹性和成本参数所确定的研发投入产出效率,当双方的研发投入产出效率相差悬殊时,新产品开发应由效率更高的一方独自承担;当双方各自承担部分开发任务时,收益共享契约可以有效调节合作者的研发努力水平;最优收益共享率介于使合作者分别达到各自最大努力水平的不同收益共享率之间,且取决于双方的研发努力弹性,而与双方的研发成本参数、新产品市场风险等因素无直接关系;研发努力弹性较高的一方应分享到更多收益,而当双方研发努力弹性相同时,应均分收益。

The relationship between the efforts of two partners in new product development can be assumed as complementation or substitution,which has an important affect on design of the incentive contract.The paper discusses the design of revenue-sharing contract in vertically collaborative new product development under the premise of complementary efforts.The analysis shows that: if two partners' input-output efficiencies have great disparity,the partner with higher one should undertake all the tasks of new product development alone;if two partners develop a new product jointly,revenue-sharing contract can regulate partners' efforts effectively;the optimal revenue-sharing ratio in the contract locates between two different revenue-sharing ratio at which the two partners' efforts can reach their respective maximums;and it does not rely on development costs,market risk,etc.,but depends on two partners' efforts elasticity,at the same time,the partner with higher effort elasticity has more share of profits,and fifty-fifty if they have the same effort elasticity.