非对称信息双边拍卖的跨流域调水水价机制研究

Study of Water Pricing Mechanism of Double Auction in the Condition of Asymmetric Information in the Inter-basin Water Transfer

跨流域调水行业有自然垄断性的特点,水行政主管部门应实行以成本为基础的价格管制,在限制调水企业获取垄断利润的同时,保证调水企业调水成本回收,以维持企业的正常经营.但是,水价管制者和调水企业关于调水成本的信息不对称,管制者处于信息劣势.借助拍卖理论,设计了非对称信息双边拍卖的跨流域调水水价机制,并以南水北调中线干线工程郑州口门水价为研究对象进行实例研究,为管制者实现水资源高效配置提供了一种新方法.

Natural monopolization is the characteristic of inter-basin water transfer industry, so department of water administration should carry out price regulations on the basis of the cost. That is to ensure cost recovery to keep the normal operation while the water transfer companies are restricted to achieve the monopoly profit. However, there are much asymmetric information between the water regulator and the water transfer companies, the water regulator is in the situation of information disadvantaged. In this paper, a double auction in conditions of asymmetric information is designed by aid of the auction theory for water pricing mechanism of inter-basin water transfer. A case study of Zhengzhou in the Middle Route Project of South-to-North Water Transfer is selected as a research object, while a new method is proposed to allocate water resources efficiently for water regulators.