从博弈论看北京市小客车数量调控

Car Purchase Quantity Control of Beijing Based on Game Theory

城市居民购买小客车表面看是居民的个人行为,其实不然.居民除对小客车拥有所有权、使用权外,还有对路网容量、环境控制等社会公共资源的占用和影响.实际要购买的是包含小客车在内的汽车使用的整个支持服务系统.本文从北京小客车发展速度、规模及对道路交通、环境污染的影响等方面入手,运用博弈方法和"公地悲剧"理论,分析了小客车无节制购买的后果———超出容量、全体受损,举例验证了目前北京限购小客车措施的科学性和合理性.最后,通过北京小客车限购措施实施百日的调查统计数据,展示了限购措施的有效性.

Though car purchasing seems as one of the personal willingness and urban residents have the rights to own and drive the cars. However, the increasing cars in city have extensive effects on public resources such as road capacity and environment protection, etc. Therefore, the car purchasing issue actually include the car support system as a whole instead of car purchasing itself. Based on the influences of car growth rate and scale on road traffic and pollution, this paper analyzes the reasons of car increase without control measures using the game theory. Then, the eoresponding results is also estimated such as the public interest may be impaired with over loaded capacity in a city by the tragedy of the commons theory. The case study is also given to illustrate the scientific nature rationality of restrain car purchase in Beijing. Finally, some validity of restrain measures are suggested through statistics within 100 days after the ear restrain measures were implemented.