后股权分置改革时代股权激励契约下的盈余管理研究

The Research on the Earnings Management Induced by Equity-based Incentive under the Post-period of Non-tradable Share Reform

管理层的自利机会主义行为会导致股权激励的滥用和失效。本文以2006--2011年按照《上市公司股权激励管理办法（试行）》，由董事会授予股票或期权的152家上市公司为样本，从应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余操纵两方面研究股权激励披露日、行权日和出售日前股权激励水平、激励方式对公司盈余管理行为的影响。在控制影响盈余管理动机和程度的其他因素后，本文发现披露日以及行权日之前管理层通过可操纵性应计利润进行了降低盈余的管理，激励所获股权出售日前则主要进行了调高盈余的真实活动盈余操纵；并且国有控股上市公司采用股票期权激励方式与盈余管理程度正相关，激励水平与盈余管理程度正相关。研究结果表明，后股权分置时代股权激励契约会引发管理层自利的盈余操纵行为，管理层会在应计项目盈余管理和真实活动盈余操纵中相机选择风险最小的盈余管理方式；股票期权并非是当前市场环境下最优的股权激励方式；股权分置改革后，大股东通过真实活动的“隧道行为”减弱，但对应计项目盈余管理并未起到抑制作用；董事会和监事会治理机制也未发挥抑制股权激励引发盈余管理的监督作用。

This paper estimate the choice of current accruals and real activities manipulation by earnings management strategies between the Chinese listed firms which grant their executives stock option or restricted stock guided by the Rule of the Administration of Stock Incentive Plans of Listed Companies under the post-period of non-tradable share reform. Using 152 A-Share listed companies awarded stock or option to executives during 2006 to 2011, we find the companies implemented equity-based incentive do more downward accrual earnings manage a quarter prior to the announcement of equity-based incentive plans and a year prior to the equity awarded than the companies without the equity-based incentive plans, while they do more upward real activities manipulate a year and a quarter prior to the sale of the equity. These are consistent with our prediction that the executives will choose the less risky and costly earnings management strategies between current accruals and real activities manipulation to maximize the net benefit from the equity-based compensation. We document that the higher levels of equity-based incentive, the more earnings are manipulated by the ex- ecutives, which means the governance effect of equity compensation is result in the managers＇ self-interest opportunism of accounting performance manipulation rather than the interest a- lignment on alleviation of agency cost. The results show that earnings manipulation behavior is more serious in the state-owned firms which granted their executives stock options, which give the evidence to support that the convexity of stock option to stock price will induce over- estimated risk-taking in turn value-decreasing managerial behavior, which will harm the shareholders since the executives of the state-owned listed companies in China are likely less risk-averse owing to the inefficacy of the mechanism of managerial market competition caused by the government appoint top manager. So, the option is not the optimal form of equity- based incentive in Chinese environment. Moreover, other earnings management motivations such as executives＇ accounting-based performance compensation contracts and political bene- fits （i. e. , reverse political costs） enhance the degrees of earnings management, but the earn- ings thresholds constrained by debt covenants do not affect the earnings management, show- ing the governance from the creditors do not take the function. Additionally, as to the other internal governance mechanisms, we find the control shareholders＇ ownership can mitigate the real activities manipulation but enhance the accrual earnings management, showing that the control shareholders＇ tunneling behaviors made by the real activities manipulations are alleviated. But the governance by directors and supervisors are inefficacy on alleviating earnings management within the equity-based incentive yet.