摘要
本文基于企业税收规避行为背后可能隐藏的动机以及带来的代理成本,系统研究了企业避税程度与股价异动之间的相关性。以2003-2010年我国上市企业为样本,研究发现,税收规避程度越高的企业,其股价发生"暴跌"的概率越高,而与股价发生"暴涨"的概率不存在统计上显著关系。并且,企业避税程度与股价暴跌的正相关关系主要体现在公司透明度较低的公司组中。这在一定程度上说明,管理者可能假借为股东节税之名,为其利益侵占行为提供掩护,从而损害股东的利益。
In this paper, we make a systematic analysis on the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and firm--specific stock price crash risk and jump based on the possible hidden moti-vation behind tax avoidance behavior and its agency cost. Using the sample of China＇s listed firms during the period of 2003-2010, it shows that corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk, but is not significantly related to stock price jump. And fur-thermore the positive relationship between corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash is mainly in the less transparent firms. To a degree, managers can use the name of tax savings to make a cover for their behavior of interest occupation, and then damage the interest of shareholders.
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期53-64,共12页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
2010年度国家自然科学基金面上项目(70972060)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(07JJD630006)
上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(CXJJ-2011-204
CXJJ-2011-327)
浙江省教科规划课题(SCG232)
