基于有限理性的城市用户群节水防污进化博弈分析

Evolution game analysis of water saving and pollution prevention for city user groups based on bounded rationality

结合当前节水防污型社会的建设需求,采用进化博弈理论对城市用户群节水防污行为进行研究,基于有限理性建立了监管部门与城市用户群的非对称进化博弈模型,通过求解监管部门群体"监管"策略和城市用户群"节水防污"策略的复制动态方程,根据支付函数参数的取值形成不同方案分别得到模型的进化趋势与进化稳定策略,以西安市经营服务业单位用户群为算例分析得到的结果与模型进化趋势相符。结果表明,监管部门进行"监管"的得益与支出比、监管部门对城市用户群奖惩力度、城市用户群采取"节水防污"的得益与支出比、博弈主体采取某特定策略的初始比例对博弈结果有影响,监管部门通过建立严格的节水防污制度,加大对是否采取节水防污的奖惩力度,城市用户群通过降低节水防污的成本,提高节水防污意识等方式有助于模型向节水防污演化。

This paper adopts an evolution game theory to study strategies of water saving and pollution prevention （SP） for the city user groups, as required by the current demand by SP community construction. We developed an asymmetric evolution game model for the supervisors and city user groups on the basis of bounded rationality, and by solving the replicated dynamic equations of this model, obtained evolutionary trends and evolutionarily stable strategies for Xi＇ an city as a case study. The analysis shows that the modeling results depends on various factors in implementing a SP measure： supervisors＇ profit and payment, city user groups＇ reward and penalties by supervisors, city user groups＇ profit and payment, and initial proportion of supervisors and city user groups. This study suggests some measures favorable to the evolution toward the SP goal. Supervisors can set up strict institution of SP or increase the reward and penalties, and city user groups can reduce the cost of SP or improve the users＇ consciousness of SP.