有先天综合判断吗——浅谈分析哲学对先天综合判断的拒绝

On Denial of the Synthetic A Priori

弗雷格试图澄清康德"隐蔽地包含"的分析概念,但他的这一努力动摇了人们的信心,逻辑经验主义者转而不相信康德分析、综合二分对于先天范畴的有效性,他们回到了休谟。蒯因则不相信康德分析、综合二分在一般意义上的有效性。而且,自然主义者普遍认为,并不存在康德意义上的先天性。在一连串的打击下,先天综合判断俨然失去了存在的合理性。尽管受到上述冲击,先天综合判断的存在问题依然只是一个悬而未决的问题;并且,我们有理由表明,哲学研究的主题回到先天综合判断是恰当的。

Frege’s attempt to clarify what Kantian analyticity of sense\|containment exactly means had severely shaked the confidence in the Synthetic A Priori truth. Logical empiricists were back to Hume with holding that no distinction between analysis and synthesis in the domain of apriority. Quine maintained that not any boundaries in general had been found between analytic and synthetic statements. Meanwhile, a number of naturalists put and end to the existence of apriority. This paper has two tasks as its goals: the first is to restate how Synthetic A Priori truths were attacked by analytical philosophers; the second is to claim that why Synthetic A Priori truths are still possible against those attacks.