摘要
本文研究同行业中上下游企业的横向兼并策略。研究结果表明 :当上下游企业以横向兼并为唯一策略变量进行对策时 ,上下游企业分别横向兼并是子博弈精练 Nash均衡。同时 ,本文讨论了政府、企业和消费者三方在兼并中的利益冲突。
The horizontal merger in the upstream and downstream firms in an industry is discussed in this paper. The analysis will show that when the upstream and downstream enterprises countermeasure with the horizontal merger as unique game variables,the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the upstream and downstream enterprises merger respectively. Furthermore,the paper focuses on the conflict of interests among the enterprises,the government and the consumers in the merger.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2000年第3期28-31,共4页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
关键词
横向兼并
对策论
上下游企业
企业兼并
horizontal merger
game theory
upstream and downstream firms