满足预算平衡的Pareto最优的团队激励契约

Pareto Optimal Sharing Rules Belancing Budget

研究了团队中的搭便车现象 ,在对熟知的团队激励之Pareto效率与预算平衡不可兼达定理重新审视后 ,指出了监督固然可获Pareto效率 ,却引致渎职与合谋之隐患 ;当团队成员为风险中性型时 ,若组织规范能有效运作 ,或团队成员主观高估其行为对集体产出之影响时 ,即使监视人缺位 ,仍有可能存在Pareto有效的预算平衡的利益分享机制 ;而当团队成员为充分风险厌恶型且能忍受一定的经济惩罚时 ,监视人可设计一种随机性惩罚团队某成员的所谓“替罪羊”机制以达到Pareto效率与预算平衡之兼容 .

Moral hazard probems in team setting is examined. It is shown that there may exist budget balancing Nash equilibrium sharing rules that yields Pareto optimal(first best) efficiency provided that any of the following three conditions is satisfied: If peer pressure plays the role of mutual monitoring, or if agents over estimate the effects of their actions on jointed production, or if agents are sufficiently risk averse. The role played by the monitors in inducing first best efficiency is also discussed.