高管集权、内部控制与会计信息质量

Concentration of Managerial Power, Internal Control and Accounting Information Quality

公司内部治理的核心之一是选择一个恰当的权力配置结构,以有利于增进公司各种制度和政策的执行效率。本文研究公司高管的权力配置结构对公司内部控制与会计信息质量之间关系的影响。采用盈余管理和财务重述衡量会计信息质量,本研究发现:(1)公司的内部控制质量与会计信息质量正相关;(2)公司内部控制对会计信息质量的提升作用受制于公司内部高管的权力配置结构。在高管权力集中的情况下,内部控制的改善对会计信息质量并没有明显的提升作用。本研究对公司内部控制制度的后续建设和实施乃至公司治理结构的改进均具有一定的启示意义。

In response to collapses of giant American corporations （e.g. Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco）, the U.S. regulators made great efforts in strengthening effectiveness of internal controls in listed U.S. firms to enhance financial reporting quality and restore investors＇ confidence in the U.S. capital market. In a manner similar to their U.S. counterparts, Chinese regulators have started to pay more attention to internal con- trols in Chinese listed firms. Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange isstied guidance on internal controls in 2006 and 2007, respectively. In 2008, Ministry of Finance, National Audit Office, China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Banking Regulatory Com- mission, and China Insurance Regulatory Commission jointly promul- gated ＂Principles and Rules on Internal Control for Enterprises＂ and later the accompanying implementation guidance and interpretations. Prior research using the U.S. data （e.g. Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh- Skaife et al. 2008; Chan et al. 2008; Goh and Li 2011） documents that fewer significant deficiencies in internal controls are associated with superior financial reporting quality. However, the association between internal control and accounting information quality may be moderated by corporate internal power structure. One key element in internal cor- porate governance mechanism is to introduce an appropriate corporate power structure, which in turn helps improve effectiveness and effi- ciency of daily operating activities and realization of corporate strate- gies. This paper studies how concentration of managerial power affects the relation between internal control quality and accounting information quality. Using discretionary accruals and the probability of restatements of previous financial reports as measures for accounting information quality, we find that： （1） accounting information quality increases with the improvement in internal controls; and （2） concentration of manage- rial power mitigates the effect of internal controls on accounting infor- mation quality. Specifically, higher internal control quality is associated with better accounting information quality only when managerial power is dispersed inside a firm. These results indicate that establishment of a ＂check-and-balance＂ mechanism in corporate governance lays a solid foundation for internal controls to take effect in monitoring and disci- plining financial reporting process and thus enhancing quality and cred- ibility of accounting information in financial statements.