需求风险和汇率风险在供应链中的传导分析

Transmission Analysis of Demand and Exchange Rate Risks in the Supply Chain

针对现有文献的缺陷,尝试着利用批发价合同构建了一个包含零售商、制造商与供应商的博弈模型。通过模型均衡,研究了需求风险和汇率风险如何在供应链中传导,并分别讨论了它们对供应链节点企业期望业绩与业绩方差的影响,及供应链节点企业之间的风险分担问题。结果表明,(1)供应链节点企业的期望业绩随市场需求波动和汇率变动程度的增加而增加;(2)供应链节点企业的业绩方差随市场需求波动和汇率变动程度的增加而增加;(3)零售商与制造商之间的相对风险分担(用零售商利润方差与制造商利润方差之比度量)随市场需求函数斜率的增加(零售商(对市场价格变化)的反应灵活性降低)而增加,而供应商与制造商之间的相对风险分担(用供应商利润方差与制造商利润方差之比度量)随供应商边际成本函数斜率的增加(供应商(对制造商的价格变化)的反应灵活性降低)而增加。这些结果从理论上表明,一方面需求风险和汇率风险可以通过节点企业之间的相互作用而在供应链中传导,另一方面供应链中的风险传导受"牛鞭效应"和节点企业利润边际的共同影响。

The main purpose of this study is to investigate how demand risk and exchange rate risk are transmitted in a supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. In the supply chain the manufacturer buys materials from the supplier and sells them to the retailer via wholesale price contracts. The demand risk roots in the uncertainty of final market demand while the exchange rate risk stems from the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer operate in different countries. Under the assumption the manufacturer＇s revenue per product sold is susceptible to exchange rate fluctuation. To examine risk transmission in the supply chain, weconstruct a two-stage game model to assess the strategic interactions among those three supply chain members. In the model, the manufacturer offers wholesale prices to retailer and supplier in stage 1. The Supplier and the retailer simultaneously respond to the manufacturer＇ offers in stage 2 via an order quality and a supply quantity, respectively.In our proposed model, the demand risk is defined as a process where based the observed final market demand. The retailer strategically orders from the manufacturer and then forces （ via the equilibrium of the game model） the manufacturer and the supplier to adjust their profit according to the final market demand. The exchange rate risk refers to when faced with volatile fluctuation of exchange rate the manufacturer strategically offers wholesale prices to the retailer and the supplier respectively and then forces （ via the equilibrium of the game model） the retailer and the supplier to vary their profits according to the exchange rate. With the model equilibrium, we measure the risk that the retailer, the manufacturer and the supplier bearwith the variance of their equilibrium profit. We further conduct a statistical analysis of the variance of the final market demand and the exchange rate. The results show that （ 1 ） the expected profit of the retailer, the manufacturer and the supplier increases along with the variance of the final demand and exchange rate; （2） the profit variance of the retailer, the manufacturer and the supplier increases along with the variance of the final demand and exchange rate; （3） the relative risks between the retailer and the manufacturer （ measured by the ratio of the retailer＇s profit variance to the manufacturer＇s profit variance） increases in the slope of the market demand function （ a higher slope indicates a lower degree of the flexibility of the retailer＇s response to price changes in the final market） while the relative risk between the supplier and the manufacturer （ measured by the ratio of the supplier＇s profit variance to the manufacturer＇s profit variance ） increases in the slope of the supplier＇s margin cost function （ a higher slope indicates a lower degree of the flexibility of the supplier＇s response to the manufacturer＇s price changes）. To summarize, the demand risk and the exchange rate risk can be transmitted in a supply chain viasupply chain partners＇ strategic interactions. Moreover, the risk transmission in a supply chain depends on both the bullwhip effect and supply chain partners＇ profit margins.