论先天知识与必然性:从康德到查尔莫斯

On Priori Knowledge and Necessity:From Kant to Chalmers

先天知识是知识论的一个重要论域,康德把必然性视为先天知识的充分必要条件,这也是传统哲学的一贯观点。但克里普克指出先天性与必然性的外延是不同的,两者并不能等同起来,由此在先天性和必然性之间打开了一道逻辑裂缝,进而危及到先天知识的存在认定。邦久和查尔莫斯分别从确证和二维语义学的角度来修复这道逻辑裂缝,试图在先天性与必然性之间架起新的桥梁,他们这种传统的论证方式都有其局限性,无法从根本上修补这道逻辑裂缝。但如果把必然性转化为一个知识论概念,从确证的角度来重新建立必然性与先天性之间的逻辑关系,那么这二者之间的康德联系依然是有效的,康德意义上的先天知识就可以获得一个更为稳固的知识论基础。

A priori knowledge is an important domain of epistemology. Kant regarded necessity as necessary and sufficient conditions of a priori knowledge, which is also the consistent view of traditional philosophy. Kripke pointed out that the extension of apriority and necessity is different, and the two cannot be equated. Such a view opens a logical gap between apriority and necessity. Bon Jour and Chalmers have tried to fix the logical gap from the perspective of justification and two-dimensional semantics to build new bridges between the apriority and necessity. The traditional argument has its limitations. However, if we transform necessity into an epistemic concept, and review this issue from the perspective of justification, we can find the Kantian contact between a priori knowl- edge and necessity is existence. A priori knowledge in the Kantian sense can get a more solid Epistemological foun- dation.