股权质押具有治理效用吗？--来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Does Stock Pledge Have Governance Utility? ——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Public Companies

作为保障债权实现的手段之一,债权银行利用质押品质量的"激励效应"控制信贷风险,以降低债务代理成本。本文以2001-2010年沪深两市A股上市公司的控股股东质押其股权获得贷款为研究对象,分析质押品质量在银行信贷决策中的治理效用,以及股权性质和金融发展对质押品治理效用的影响。实证结果显示,股权质押样本的质量显著高于配对样本;连续质押样本的质量显著高于非连续质押样本;股权性质所代表的政治关系显著影响了债权银行质押品质量控制效用;金融发展水平越高,债权银行质押品质量控制的效用越显著。本文的实证研究结果表明,股权性质所体现的政治关系为控股股东通过股权质押获得贷款,利用"隧道效应"侵占中小股东利益的现象提供了可能的解释。

With'incentive effect', collateral values are generally used by creditor banks to reduce their agency cost of debt. Based on the controlling holder's stock pledge data from listed companies in China's stock market over the 2001-2010 periods, this paper systematically analyzes the governance utility of collateral value in bank's credit decision, and also examines the influence of political relationship and financial development. Empirical results indicate that: 1) the quality on stock pledge sample is significantly more than matched sample; 2) the quality on continuous pledge sample is significantly more than non-continuous pledge sample; 3) political relationship reduces the governance utility of quality control on collateral, and 4) the governance utility of collateral quality is more significant under higher financial development level. The conclusion of this paper shows political relationship could provide the explanation for controlling shareholder's tunneling with stock pledge.