摘要
针对共同物流运作特点,以博弈论为工具分析了共同物流各成员行为模式,由此建立共同物流参与企业间的非零和动态合作博弈模型。分析了博弈模型中求解的两种常用方法存在的不足,即Shapley值法和核心法解空间不存在问题,提出了改进的核心法,同时对采用改进的核心法所求解结果作为合作风险分担方案的合理性和稳定性进行了论证,以此形成在共同物流运作中建立风险公益金制度的理论基础,最后举例进行了分析说明。
According to the characteristic of common logistics operation, this paper analyzes the behavior pattern of various members in common logistics that based on game theory, and establishes the common logistics participation enterprise's non-vanishing dynamic cooperation gambling model. This paper has analyzed the insufficiency of two commonly used method of gambling model solution, that is to say, the Shapley value law and core law have no problem in solution space. Then We propose the improvement core law and used the results of improvement core law to prove the rationality and the stability of the cooperation risk share plan, which promotes the formation of a theory basis of establishing risk common reserve fund in common logistics operation. Finally an empirical study is presented.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第1期111-115,共5页
Systems Engineering
基金
湖南省哲学社会科学基金委托项目(11JD37)
国家社科基金资助项目(11BYJ081)
关键词
松弛变量
改进核心法
风险公益金
共同物流
Slack Variable
Improvement Core Law
Risk Common Reserve Fund
Common Logistics