期刊文献+

信息中介与投资者满意度——基于证券分析师的实证研究 被引量:1

Information Intermediary and Investor satisfaction:An Empirical Research from the Perspective of Securities Analyst
原文传递
导出
摘要 从证券分析师的信息中介服务角度出发,以公众投资者为研究对象,通过问卷调查和构建结构方程模型来探讨我国公众投资者对证券分析师信息服务的满意度,得出如下结论:(1)对投资者满意度影响最大的因素是分析师服务质量,它对满意度有直接的正向影响;其次是分析师形象和投资者预期,二者通过分析师服务质量对投资者满意度产生间接的正向影响。(2)对投资者忠诚度影响最大的因素是投资者满意度。这说明分析师服务质量的提高,能够直接提升投资者满意度,从而进一步减少抱怨情绪和提升忠诚度。 From the perspective of information intermediary service of securities analyst, this paper takes the public investors as the study subjects to discuss the satisfaction of public investors upon the information service offered by securities analysts through questionnaire survey and structure equation model. The results show that, firstly, the factor having the greatest effect on investor satisfaction is the service quality of the analysts, which has a direct positive effect on the satisfaction; followed by analyst' s image and investors' expectation, which have indirect positive effects on investor satisfac- tion through analysts' service quality. Secondly, the factor having the greatest effect on investor' s loyalty is the investor' s satisfaction. This indicates that the improvement of the service quality of the analysts can directly enhance the investor' s satisfaction, then it is possible to further reduce their complaints and promote their loyalty.
出处 《当代财经》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第3期52-63,共12页 Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71073101 71273165 71273166) 上海市浦江人才计划项目(11PJC066)
关键词 证券分析师 信息中介 公众投资者 满意度 securities analyst information intermediary public investor satisfaction
  • 相关文献

参考文献26

二级参考文献124

共引文献158

同被引文献23

  • 1陆蓉,陈百助,徐龙炳,谢新厚.基金业绩与投资者的选择——中国开放式基金赎回异常现象的研究[J].经济研究,2007,42(6):39-50. 被引量:202
  • 2HolmstromB” Milgrom P. R.. Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives [J]. Econometrica,1987,55(2): 303-28.
  • 3CohenS. I., Starks L. T.‘ Estimation Risk and Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers [J]. Management Science,1988, 34(9): 1067-1079.
  • 4GrinblattM.,Titman S.. How Clients can Win the Gaming Game[J]. Journal of Portfolio Management, 1987, 13(4): 14-20.
  • 5GrinblattM” Titman S.. Adverse Risk Incentives and the Design of Performance-Based Contracts [J]. ManagementScience, 1989, 35(7): 807-822.
  • 6BrownK. C” Harlow W. V” Starks L. T., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives inthe Mutual Fund IndustryfJ]. Journal of Finance, 1996, 51(1): 85-110.
  • 7VillatoroF.. The Delegated Portfolio Management Problem: Reputation and Herding[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2009, 33(11): 2062-2069.
  • 8AikmanD., Nelson B” Tanaka M.. Reputation, Risk-taking, and Macroprudential Policy [J]. Journal of Banking &Finance 2015, 50(1): 428-439.
  • 9ChevalierJ” Ellison G.. Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1997, 105(3): 1167-1200.
  • 10BrownS. J” Goetzmann W. N” Park J.. Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTAIndustry[J]. Journal of Finance, 2001,56(5): 1869-1886.

二级引证文献4

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部