中国总部经济的过度竞争与治理

Over Competition and Governance on China’s Headquarters Economy

地方政府竞相出台财税等优惠政策吸引总部企业入驻,人为造成了总部经济的过度竞争。具体表现在,从成本收益标准看,过度竞争抬高了吸引总部入驻的政府支出,降低了总部经济的实际收益;从可行性标准看,许多地区并不具备发展总部经济的客观条件;从趋同度标准看,各地在发展总部经济上的目标定位大多相同。地方政府在总部经济上的过度竞争,引发了地方税收无序竞争,社会资源有效配置失衡、市场秩序破坏和区域差距加大等诸多问题。究其根源,在于中国财政分权背景下的地方政府政绩考核制度。当前,为规避地方政府在总部经济上的过度竞争,迫切需要加强总部经济发展的顶层设计,切实转变地方政府职能,完善政府权力运行机制和科学的政绩考核制度,建立总部经济错位竞争和联动发展机制。

Many local governments established preferential policies against each other to encourage investment of headquarters enterprises, which caused the over competition of headquarters economy. It can be seen from the above aspects： from the cost-benefit standard, over competition raises the government cost, reduces the realistic income of headquarters economy; from the feasibility standard, many areas do not have the right condition of headquarters economy; from the convergence standard, the aim of local governments always are same. Many social problems was caused by over competition, such as tax shift, Invalid configuration of social resources, the order of the market failure and area difference enlarges and so on. To avoid over competition, the rights of operational mechanisms and scientific performance evaluation system should be improved, the top-level design of headquarters should be strengthened and the regional competition must link with dislocation development.