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汽车保险市场的信息不对称:来自商业第三者责任险的证据 被引量:6

Information Asymetry in Auto Insurance Market:Evidence from Third Party Liability Insurance
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摘要 本文修正了Richaudeau(1999)提出的保障-风险条件相关模型,考虑到索赔次数中的"零膨胀"现象,采用零膨胀Poisson分布拟合索赔次数,以我国汽车商业第三者责任保险作为研究对象,研究了中国车险市场的信息不对称问题。实证结果表明,在控制公开信息的基础上,我国汽车保险市场仍存在显著的信息不对称问题。但是,保险公司可以通过费率厘定、无赔款优待制度、附加险设计等方法分离不同风险的投保人,减轻信息不对称程度对公司经营的影响。 Using Zero-inflated Poisson to fit claim number of the third party liability insurance, we modify the coverage-risk conditional correlation model supposed by Richaudeau (1999) to analysis the information asymmetry in Chinese automobile insurance market. The empirical result shows, when public information are controlled, there exit robust evidence of information asymmetry in Chinese auto insurance market. Insurers can separate different level of insured through experience rating, no claim discount system and product supplying, which helps alleviate negative influence of information asymmetry.
作者 吴洪 赵桂芹
出处 《数理统计与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第2期359-368,共10页 Journal of Applied Statistics and Management
基金 上海财经大学211工程三期重点学科建设项目资助
关键词 信息不对称 第三者责任险 零膨胀Poisson回归 information asymmetry, third party liability insurance, zero inflated Poisson regression
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参考文献22

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二级参考文献26

  • 1蔡英哲 郑安峰.《台湾车体损失保险不对称讯息的实证研究》[J].管理学报,2006,23(2):227-240.
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引证文献6

二级引证文献20

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