高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究

Executive Compensation Affects Firm Performance:The Empirical Comparative Study on State-owned and Non-State-owned Enterprises

高管薪酬与公司绩效一直都是学术界和实务界关注的热点。本文选取2003-2010年沪深两市296家国有和176家非国有A股上市公司为样本,在控制了高管持股比例、公司规模、股权集中度和两职兼任等因素之后,实证分析了不同所有权结构的公司高管薪酬对公司绩效影响的差异。研究结果表明,高管薪酬水平与公司绩效显著正相关,且随着高管持股数量的增加,非国有上市公司高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响程度更高,但国有上市公司则相反;公司规模的扩大会降低高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响,且只有当国有上市公司和非国有企业的股权集中度在不同的区间范围内,高管薪酬与公司绩效才表现出显著正相关。

Executive compensation and company performance have always been the hot spots of the academic circles and busi- ness world. This research~ samples select from 463 State -owned A-share listed companies and 176 non - State -owned A - share listed companies in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We take executives holding ratio, company size, ownership concentration and CEO duality as control variables in order that we can analyze the difference of the company ownership structure different effect to the relationship of executives pay and company performance. This study arrive at the following conclusions by analyzing the significant relationship between executives pay level and company performance. Additionally, when the holding numbers increase, the effect of non -State -owned listed companies＇executives compensation on company performance will increase. But State -owned listed company is contrast to that. The expanding of company size will reduce the incentive effect on performance. In addition, only when the z index of state - owned and non - state - owned listed compa- ny are in a specific range, can we observe the positive significant relationship between executive pay and company perform-