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投资者保护制度变革、融资偏好与资本结构 被引量:6

Investor Protection System Changing,Financing Preferences and Capital Structure
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摘要 以沪深A股上市公司资本结构的变迁为研究对象,研究投资者保护制度的变革对上市公司融资偏好和资本结构的影响。研究发现新投资者保护制度的实施虽然提高了投资者保护的整体水平,但相对而言,对债权保护水平的影响更为显著,债权保护水平和股权保护水平的提高有助于上市公司降低对股权融资的偏好,增加债务融资特别是长期债务融资比重。 This passage research the influence ences and capital structure that is based on the S of the investor protection system changing to the financing prefer- hanghai and shenzhen A shares listed company capital structure changing. The study found that the implementation of the new investor protection system that improvd the overall level of protection of investors, but relative to character, the influence to the creditor' s rights protection level is more significant, and the creditor' s rights protection level and equity protection was could be reduce the equity fi- nancing preference, and increase the proportion of debt financing especially long - term debt financing proportion.
作者 蒋俊贤
出处 《经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第3期65-68,共4页 On Economic Problems
关键词 投资者保护 融资偏好 资本结构 investors protection financing preference capital structure
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参考文献4

  • 1王勇.完全契约与不完全契约——两种分析方法的一个比较[J].经济学动态,2002(7):22-26. 被引量:11
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二级参考文献13

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