摘要
文章通过构建一个N次多期迭代随机实验模型,模拟了政府非对称管制下的电信市场演化,进而分析政府对电信产业不同技术格局下的最优管制策略。当电信寡头间技术创新效率无差异时,价格下限管制会有效提升社会福利,但可能引致恶性竞争,这时互联互通管制对企业技术创新水平和消费者福利提升的影响是不同步的,监管部门需要根据具体的政策目标拿捏好管制力度;当电信寡头间技术创新效率存在差异时,互联互通管制力度的加大对企业技术创新水平和消费者福利提升的影响是同步的,政府应该实施完全互联互通管制。
This paper constructs a randomized experimental model with N-time multi-generations iterative procedure and simulates the evolution of telecommunication market under asymmetric regulation to analyze govern- ments' optimal strategy of regulation on telecommunication industry with different technological patterns. When there is no difference among the techno- logical innovation efficiency of telecommunication oligopolies,price-floor regulation can effectively enhance social welfare, but may lead to malignant competition~ the effects of interconnection regulation on corporate level of technological innovation and the increase in consumer welfare are asynchronous, so regulators need to figure out regulation intensity according to specific policy objectives. When there is difference among the technological innovation efficiency of telecommunication oli- gopolies, the effects of interconnection regulation on corporate level of technologi- cal innovation and the increase in consumer welfare are synchronous, so govern- ments should implement complete interconnection regulation.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期68-79,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金重大项目(10zd&017)
国家社科基金青年项目(11CJY037)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资助项目(105561GK)
国家统计局全国统计科研重点项目(2011LZ001)
关键词
电信市场
随机实验
非对称管制
互联互通
telecommunication market
randomized experiment
asym-metric regulation
interconnection