期刊文献+

学术价值与商业价值:企业研发外包中的终止权配置研究 被引量:6

Academic Value vs. Commercial Value: The Research on the Allocation of Termination Rights in the Process of R&D Outsourcing of the Firm
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摘要 在以医药产业为代表的产业的研发外包过程中,委托方追求商业化目标,代理人追求学术化目标。由此终止权的配置就至为重要。如果代理方所致力于筛选的先导化合物的学术(商业)化程度小(大)于某个临界值,那么作为委托方的企业会将终止权授予给代理方;而如果该先导化合物的学术(商业)化程度大(小)于某个临界值,那么委托方将保留终止权。随着执行性工资与先导化合物总价值的比值的增大,委托方不授权的区间将缩小;在执行性工资与先导化合物总价值的比值较小(大)时,委托方授权的区间会随着该比值的增大而扩大(缩小)。委托方的授权是具有社会效率的,而当代理方所筛选化合物的学术化程度很大时,委托方的不授权是社会无效率的。既有的经验性证据在很大程度上验证了上述部分结论。 In the process of R&D outsourcing, the principal pursues commercial goals, while the agent pursues academic goals, hence, the allocation of termination rights becomes important. If the academic extent of the lead compound that the agent screens is below a threshold, that is, the commercial extent of the lead compound that the agent screens is ahove a threshold, then the firm, which functions as a principal, will delegate the termination rights to the agent; if the academic extent of the lead compound that the agent screens is above a threshold, that is, the commercial extent of the lead compound that the agent screens is below a threshold, then the firm will retain the termination rights. As the ratio of the implementing wage to the total value of the lead compound becomes larger, the interval of the principal's no-delegating will become narrower; when the ratio of the implementing wage to the total value of the lead compound is relatively small, the interval of the principal's delegating will become wider as the ratio become larger, however, when the ratio of the implementing wage to the total value of the lead compound is relatively large, the interval of the principal's delegating will become narrower as the ratio become larger. The principal's delegating is socially efficient, while the principal's no- delegating is not necessarily socially efficient : when the academic extent of the lead compound that the agent screens is very large, the principal's no-delegating is not socially efficient. As for empirical analyses, the empirical evidence in reality proves some theoretical results to a great extent.
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第3期148-160,共13页 Economic Research Journal
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"企业研发外包组织模式与控制权分配研究:基于创新的交易成本视角"(71002051) 上海市软科学基金项目"企业研发外包的组织基础与机制设计研究"(007) "中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"资助
关键词 学术价值 商业价值 研发外包 终止权配置 : Academic Value Commercial Value R&D 0utsourcing Allocation of Termination Rights
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共引文献32

同被引文献83

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