摘要
为研究两个时期中企业主的互惠性偏好对员工的动态激励效应,从利益冲突角度构建了互惠性管理者与员工策略选择的两阶段序贯博弈模型.结果表明,在动态策略坏境中,互惠依然具有显著的激励作用,管理者的互惠性偏好会迫使员工的最优策略选择发生局部的收敛,从而一定程度上替代契约的功效,并且在一定条件下,委托人的收益将大于理性条件下的收益水平.
In order to research the dynamic incentive effects of business owners＇ reciprocity preterences m two periods, this paper constructs a two-period dynamic game model based on the behaviors of reciprocal principals and employees with interest conflicts. The result shows that, in a dynamic strategy environment, reciprocity still has significant incentive effect, and the principal＇s reciprocity motivation may make the employees＇ optimal decision behavior occur some degree of convergence, which plays the role of contracts to some extent, and, under certain conditions, the principal＇s profit will be greater than the income level under the condition of rationality.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第1期28-37,共10页
Journal of Systems Engineering
关键词
互惠
利益
理性
收敛
reciprocity
interest
rationality
convergence
