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采购拍卖中保留价的策略性披露 被引量:1

The Strategic Revelation of Reservation Pricein Procurement Auction
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摘要 拍卖中保留价规则的重要作用在于,通过设立保留价,防止成交价格过低(在采购拍卖中是防止采购成本过高),从而保护拍卖人的利益.研究在降低采购成本的目标下,采购商该公开保留价还是隐藏保留价的问题.即在第一价格密封拍卖和第二价格密封拍卖两种拍卖方式下,分别推导了保留价公开与隐藏时供应商的报价策略与采购商的期望采购成本,并在供应商成本服从均匀分布的情形下比较了各种情况下采购商的采购成本.结果表明:若采购商设定的保留价较小,采购商应该公开保留价;若保留价较大,采购商应隐藏保留价.对采购商而言,第一价格拍卖总是优于第二价格拍卖. The reservation price rules in auction aim to prevent the too low (too high in procurement auction) transaction price and protect the profit of the auctioneer. The goal of the paper is to find whether the purchaser should reveal the reservation price in order to reduce the procurement cost. In the first sealed auction and the second sealed auction, when the reservation price is announced and hidden, we respectively developed the bidding strategies of the suppliers and the procurement cost of the purchaser which was com- pared under the assumption that the costs of the suppliers are uniformly distributed. The result shows that the purchaser should keep the reservation price secret unless the reservation price is small. Compared with the second sealed bid auction, the first sealed bid auction is always a better choice for the purchaser.
作者 黄毅 胡二琴
出处 《湖北工业大学学报》 2013年第1期32-35,59,共5页 Journal of Hubei University of Technology
基金 湖北省教育厅项目(Q20131406)
关键词 采购拍卖 公开保留价 隐藏保留价 对称均衡 procurement auction announced reservation price hidden reservation price symmetric equilibrium
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参考文献13

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二级参考文献23

  • 1张利荣,王素梅.一级密封招标的最优报价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005,25(6):121-124. 被引量:29
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