专用性人力资本投资套牢研究——基于利益一体化和股权激励方法的探析

The Research of Specific Human Capital Investment Hold-up Based on the Vertical Integration of Interests and Equity Incentive

专用性人力资本投资不能在企业和员工之间转移的特性使得控制权纵向一体化及企业和员工共同持有公司股票两种办法无法根本解决人力资本专用性投资产生的套牢问题。但是,在企业和员工的利益博弈中,收益分配的比重和高水平的股票未来收益的预期会提高双方的专用性人力资本投资水平。

The vertical integration of capital control can not prevent the hold-up problem because the investment of specific human capital can not be transferred between companies and employees. However, the vertical integration of interests obtained through holding the company stock by the companies and employees can resolve that difficulty. In the interact game between the companies and employees, high proportion of the income distribution and the high level expectation of future stock gains can increase the level of specific human capital investment, but it is still lower than the Pareto optimal level of investment.