期刊文献+

技术创新中前置型技术授权的中介引入决策问题

Decision-Making Problem Of Intermediary Agent Importing During Prepositive-Dealing Technology Licensing For Technology Innovation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在技术创新中,前置型技术授权的对价支付最迟在技术转移过程完成后即需结清,此时尚无法确认引进技术的价值,因此买方对技术目标的选择具有风险性。买方在选择技术目标时可以借助技术中介的力量,研究在何种情况下引入中介对买方有利。将买方自行搜寻技术目标的成本和买方支付的中介费用的绝对值转化成创新成本降幅的一定比例,当契约价格条款中存在可变费用成分时,这两个比例和可能存在的固定费用成分共同作为决策因素;当契约价格条款中不存在可变费用成分时,算术平均意义下的搜寻成本和中介费用绝对值以及反映有无中介情况下买方在技术转移过程中努力水平差异的投入增加额共同成为决策因素。 During technology innovation process,for prepositive-dealing technology licensing,buyer must pay at the end of technology transfer.It is very important for buyer to seek appropriate target technology and intermediary agent become necessary.This article studies the problem of decision-making for intermediary agent importing.The seeking cost and intermediary cost paid by buyer are been transferred into two proportion values of the decline of innovation cost.When there exist state-contingent royalty component in the contract price items,these two proportion values and the fixed cost component which may be exist will decide the problem together.Otherwise,the absolute values of seeking cost and intermediary cost,which are both calculated following arithmetic mean,and the investments addition paid by buyer when there is not intermediary are all the decision factors.
出处 《科技进步与对策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第6期16-20,共5页 Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70771069) 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(NCET-06-0783) 中央高校青年教师科研启动基金项目(skq201116)
关键词 前置型技术授权 中介引入 技术创新 Prepositive-Dealing Technology Licensing Intermediary Agent Importing Moral Hazard
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

  • 1岳贤平,李廉水,顾海英.逆向选择条件下技术许可中排他性价格契约研究[J].科学学研究,2009,27(1):118-126. 被引量:11
  • 2JAY PIL CHOI. Technology transfer with moral hazard[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, 19:249-266.
  • 3emmanOel DECHENAUX, MARIE THURSBY, JER-RY THURSBY. Shirking, sharing risk and shelving; therole of university license contracts [J]. International Jour-nal of Industrial Organization,2009 ,27 :80-91.
  • 4DEBAPRIYA SEN, YAIR TAUMAN. General licensingschemes for a cost-reducing innovation[J]. Games and Eco-nomic Behavior,2007 ?59 : 163-186.
  • 5RUBEN HERNANDEZ-MURILLO, GERARD LLOBET.Patent licensing revisited: heterogeneous firms and productdifferentiation [J]. International Journal of Industrial Or-ganization, 2006 ,24 : 149-175.
  • 6CHANGYING LI,XIAOYAN GENG. Licensing to a dura-ble-good monopoly[J], Economic Modelling, 2008, 25 : 876-884.
  • 7RAMON FAUU-OLLER,JOEL SANDONIS. Welfare re-ducing licensing [J]. Games and Economic Behavior,2002,41:192-205.
  • 8RAMON FAUL-OLLERJOEL SANDONS. To merge or tolicense:implications for competition policy[J]. InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization,2003,21:655-672.
  • 9耿子扬,汪贤裕,张莉.原始创新中组织间技术转移效率影响因素研究[J].科技进步与对策,2011,28(21):6-9. 被引量:1

二级参考文献47

共引文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部