基于供应链金融的应收账款融资博弈分析

A Game Analysis of Account Receivable Financing based on Supply Chain Finance

中小企业(SME)融资难制约企业发展,但中小企业有很多应收账款,且融资利用率低。供应链中核心企业虽然可以利用自己的优势将资金压力转移,但供应链中任何链条的断裂都会对供应链造成影响。中国银行业面对激烈的竞争也急于找到新的产品来提高经营效率,处于信贷劣势的中小企业是很大的市场,供应链金融应收账款融资业务成为三方共同的选择。本文引进违约罚数运用博弈论的方法,求解传统应收账款融资和供应链金融应收账款融资的纳什均衡,根据实际操作对模型进行了修正,通过比较得出供应链金融应收账款融资可以达到帕累托有效率的均衡,同时可以降低企业融资成本、提高放贷率。

It＇s hard for SME to get financing and this is the key factor that affects development. But SME has many ac- counts receivabal and makes less use of them. And at the same time, the core corporation of one supply chain try to transfer the pressure of capital to SME. However, the rupture of any SME may disterbs the whole chain. While in the back market, Ghinese banks are facing the serious competition. How to improve the efficiency comes to be the big prob- lem for all banks. So accounts receivabal financing under supply chain finance may be the best proposal for all. This thesis uses geme theory to analyze traditional accounts receivabal financing and accounts receivabal financing under sup- ply chain finance and makes a compare. It comes to a conclusion that accounts reeeivabal financing under supply chain finance can optimize the equilibrium and make the Pareto efficiency be ture. At the same time, it can save cost and im- prove the financing rate.