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国际经济保护主义与经济全球化的调整期 被引量:9

The Global Economic Protectionism and the Phase of Globalization Adjustment
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摘要 在当今全球各国涌动蔓延的保护主义浪潮,突破了传统的贸易保护主义框架,广泛渗透和覆盖至国际经济的各个领域。国际经济保护主义体现为以保护本国经济利益为目的的阻碍甚至逆转经济全球化的政策措施的总和,是经济全球化与各国自身经济利益之间的潜在冲突在经济衰退期内集中爆发所引发的必然调整。它并非是一个不断加剧的过程,而是与经济周期直接联系、在全球经济复苏的脆弱期集中兴起的。面对这一特殊形势,中国要注重短期的应对策略与长期的产业创新规划相结合,并特别关注下一个新科技革命的到来。 The global protectionism wave at present, spreading among the major countries, has broken through the frame-work of the traditional trade protectionism, and permeated into the various areas of the world economies. The global eco-nomic protectionism showing as the numerous measures are hindering and revising the globalization, and is the necessary adjustment which reflects the conflicts among the countries participating into the globalization. However, the global protec-tionism is not supposed to be a continuous aggravated process. Contrastingly, it is closely related to the business cycle and most likely emerging in the fragile recovery. During this exceptional phase, China government should be better to combine the short term coping measures and the long term industrial strategy, and particularly, pay much more attention to the coming technology revolution.
作者 佟家栋 刘程
出处 《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第2期131-138,共8页 Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition
基金 国家社科基金重大课题(12&ZD087) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(NKZXB1149)
关键词 国际保护主义 经济全球化 金融保护主义 Global Economic Protectionism Economic Globalization Financial Protectionism
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