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上行下效:高官腐败的示范效应研究 被引量:23

The Negative Role Model of Corrupt High Government Officials in the Spread of Corruption:Evidence from China
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摘要 在近20年中,中国的高官腐败现象愈发普遍。与普通官员相比,由于高官享有更大的权威,因此,高官腐败可能会对其他官员产生更强的示范效应,进而促进腐败行为的扩散。文章以2003~2007年中国31个省的数据为样本,研究发现,中国的官员腐败率在各省之间具有显著的传染效应,并且这种传染效应主要来自高官腐败的示范效应。上述发现说明,频繁的高官腐败所产生的示范效应可能是造成中国官员高腐败率问题的一个重要机制,因此,有效反腐败策略的一个重点,可能是加强并完善对高级别官员的监督和管理。 In the past 20 years, corruption by high - level government officials has become widespread in China. Because of their position of authority, their corruption has a greater effect than that of other government officials and is a cause of the spread of corruption. By using data from the 31 provincial - level governments from 2003 to 2007, this paper investigates the contagion effects of high - level government officials, and finds that corrup- tion is very contagious between provinces and the main reason for this is the negative role model of corrupt high - level government officials. This indicates that widespread corruption of high - level government officials could be an important source of corruption in China. Therefore, the focus of an effective anti - corruption policy should be strengthening and improving oversight and supervision of high - level officials.
作者 陈刚
出处 《经济社会体制比较》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第2期155-164,共10页 Comparative Economic & Social Systems
基金 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(项目编号:12YJC790008) 国家社会科学基金青年项目(项目编号:12CJL022)
关键词 腐败 社会互动 传染效应 示范效应 Corruption Social Interaction Contagion Effect Demonstration Effect
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参考文献21

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二级参考文献59

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