基于完全信息假设下的中美碳排放博弈分析

Game Analysis of Sino-US Carbon Emission Based on Complete Information Assumption

中国和美国作为世界上最大的碳排放国,面临着巨大的减排压力。为此,两国必须在应对气候变化与能源安全领域加强合作以减少碳排放对全球气候变化的不利影响。本文通过静态纳什均衡和动态纳什均衡博弈的相关模型,分析中美碳减排博弈合作的条件及收益,为中美碳排放合作的谈判提供借鉴。

Climate warming has become a hot issue in the world. Reducing carbon emissions can mitigate global warming. The carbon emission has become one of the game focus of many countries. China and the United States, as the world＇s largest emitters of carbon gases, have faced enormous pressure on greenhouse gas mitigation. For this reason, the two countries must strengthen cooperation of climate change and energy security in order to reduce the adverse impact of a large number of carbon emissions on global climate change. The paper analyses the conditions and income of Sino-US carbon emission reduction by the static Nash equilibrium and the dynamic Nash equilibrium and provides references for the Sino-US negotiations and cooperation of carbon emission.