摘要
构建经营者不合谋和合谋2种情形下的委托-代理模型,对多个经营者的激励机制进行分析。基于此,提出了企业所有者为应对经营者合谋的机会主义行为应该采取的措施。
The paper puts forward the principal-agent models with and without collusion based on the principal-agent theory.It also analyzes incentive mechanism according to the model results.Finally,it discusses measures that should be taken in response to speculative behaviors of the managers based on the analysis of the model.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期524-527,共4页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
科学技术部国家软科学课题资助项目(2011GXS2D036)
关键词
合谋
经营者
委托-代理
激励机制
collusion
managers
principal-agent
incentive mechanism
