供应链上下游企业合作过程中道德风险的制度契约治理

Institutional contract governance of moral hazard in the cooperation process between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain

道德风险普遍存在于供应链上下游企业合作中。本文从供应链上下游企业间的合作出发,建立上下游企业合作的博弈时间序列图,在考虑上游合作企业拥有信息优势的条件下,设计一种激励制度,对存在于上游合作企业的道德风险问题进行防范治理,得出在信息不对称的条件下下游核心企业总可以找到一种价格制度契约,对上游企业的道德风险行为进行治理。最后对激励制度强度系数的敏感性进行分析,得出合作企业的风险规避系数、成本系数,供应链环境的不确定性,以及核心企业的收益系数对供应链上下游企业合作过程汇总存在的道德风险治理的影响规律。

Moral hazard is widespread in the cooperation process between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain. The paper,from the perspective of the supply chain cooperation between the upstream and downstream enterprise,builds the game time sequence diagram. Considering the information advantage in the upstream cooperation enterprise we design a kind of incentive institution to govern the moral hazard in the upstream cooperation enterprise,concluding downstream core enterprise carl always find a contract price to govern the moral hazard of the upstream enterprise in the condition of asymmetric information. Finally,analyzing the sensitivity of incentive institution intensity, we draw the inference rule of many factors to moral hazard governance in the cooperation process between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain,which include the coefficient of risk aversion,cost coefficient of upstream enterprise,the uncertainty of the supply chain environment, and the core enterprises revenue coefficient.