工伤社会保险中的“逆向选择”问题:内在逻辑与经验分析

“Adverse Selection" Problem of Industrial Injury Insurance:the Inner Logic and Empirical Analysis

逆向选择是"雇主完全责任"保险市场中常见的一种现象,会导致保险市场的失灵。通常认为工伤社会保险能够克服逆向选择。但工伤社会保险制度也存在内化性不足,从而使得制度的逆向选择问题难以有效地规避。由于目前中国工伤社会保险制度还存在不完善之处,逆向选择问题仍很严重。笔者的实证研究表明,在政府和企业的博弈条件下,通过对工伤社会保险缴费率实行差别费率的分类设计合约组合、建立起一套激励相容机制,是解决当前中国工伤保险制度中存在"逆向选择"问题的关键。

The empirical study of the paper shows that it is vital to set up incentive mechanism by the rate combination of industrial injury insurance premium difference against the game theory between government and enterprises in order to provide solution for the current problem of adverse selection of industrial injury in China.